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Abstract
This article uses an institutional lens to analyze organizational failure. It does this through a
historical case study of Digital Equipment Corporation, an innovator and market leader of
minicomputers who faltered and eventually failed during the period of technological change
brought on by the emergence of the personal computer. The failure of Digital Equipment
Corporation is interesting because it occurred despite its ability to adapt to changing
technological forces. An institutional analysis shows that while Digital Equipment Corporation
was able to develop personal computers widely considered technologically superior to its
competitors, it resisted broader changes occurring in its institutional context. This study suggests
that responding to external forces of change, such as technology, may not be enough. An
organization must determine if and how such change might lead to a shift in its institutional
context and then develop strategies to address such change.

Keywords
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Organizational failure has received considerable attention over the decades (McKinley,
1993; Munir, 2005; Kam, 2005; McGovern, 2007; Mackie, 2012; Oertel, Thommes, &
Walgenbach, 2016). What organizational failure is and how it occurs is complex, although an
ability to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes has become a central focus in the
literature (Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989). Technology change as an external force has received
particular attention. It has been theorized as disruptive (Christensen, 1997), competencedestroying (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), impacting processes (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978),
and obsoleting business models (Teece, 2010). In many of these models, technology change is
seen as a threat to those organizations who are unable to adapt, leading them to irrelevancy or
even failure. The message is clear—adapt to technological change or risk failure.
But how does one explain failure when an organization is able to adapt to technological
change. This article explores such a case and proposes that organizational failure may be better
understood through institutional analysis. It does this through a historical case study of the rise
and fall of Digital Equipment Corporation, the inventor and market leader of the minicomputer
that later faltered and eventually failed during a period of technological change brought on by the
personal computer. By all accounts, Digital Equipment Corporation quickly adapted to this
technology change and developed a line of personal computers that was widely considered to be
technologically superior to other personal computers in the market. Yet, Digital Equipment
Corporation still failed. The answer to this puzzle and contribution of this article is in the
changing institutional context that occurred during the emergence of the personal computer.
In perhaps the only other academic study of Digital Equipment Corporation, Edgar
Schein and colleagues pointed to its culture as being primarily responsible for its rise and fall
(Schein, DeLisi, Kampas, & Sonduck, 2003). As an organization evolves, it needs to be able to
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adjust and shift its culture to fit the predominant issues and challenges of that particular period in
its life cycle. Digital Equipment Corporation, according to Schein et al., was unable to make this
shift. While an important contribution toward understanding change, this perspective largely
focuses on the organization and misses the key changes occurring in the environment and
broader institutional context. This article seeks to add this perspective. It argues that culture and
particularly technology change per se are not the primary cause for Digital Equipment
Corporation’s failure. Rather, it is a shift in the dominant institutional logics brought on by
technology change, and Digital Equipment Corporation’s resistance of this shift that led to the
organization’s demise.
Following a brief review of the literature on technology change, organizational
capability, and institutional logics. Research methods of this study are then is presented followed
by a historical account of the rise and fall of Digital Equipment Corporation, done through the
lens of institutional change. An analysis of Digital Equipment Corporation’s failure is then
presented followed by implications for practice. This article concludes with suggestions for
future research.
Technology Change
Technology change is an external force that can jolt an institutionalized field into a state
of flux or destabilization (Hinings, Greenwood, Reay, & Suddaby, 2004). These jolts are difficult
to anticipate and can threaten an organization’s viability (Meyer, 1982). This is particularly
challenging for an incumbent because technology change goes beyond the technology itself and
impacts products, processes, markets, value propositions and business models (Tripsas, 2009).
The literature of technology change is consistent with the broader change literature, categorizing
modes of change as either incremental or discontinuous or radical. Incremental is first-order
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change that supports and strengthen an organization’s existing structures and competencies,
while discontinuous is second-order change that poses a threat to those structures and capabilities
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Meyer Brooks & Goes, 1990). The
punctuated equilibrium literature was introduced as an integration of the two depicting change as
long periods of incremental improvements that are punctuated by discontinuous breakthroughs
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Gersick, 1991). This model has also been depicted as an S-curve,
where existing technology incrementally grows until it reaches its natural limit, which is then
overtaken by new technology causing discontinuous change (Foster 1988). In these
conceptualizations, incumbents are theorized as having advantages during periods of incremental
change but are at risk during periods of discontinuous change. During these periods of
discontinuous change, an organization’s product lifecycle could end quite suddenly (Utterback,
1994), find its existing capabilities irrelevant (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and its business
model obsolete (Teece, 2010).
Creating new product classes using new technologies can be risky for incumbents as it is
a fundamentally different activity than incrementally improving and supporting what already
exists. It requires different skills, processes, and activities (March, 1991; Boumgarden,
Nickerson, and Zenger, 2012) and the tension between exploring new products and exploiting
existing ones becomes a major organizational challenge (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). This
may explain why incumbents tend to use exploitation as a way to protect itself from new entrants
but then become threatened when exploration creates discontinuous technological change.
Technology Change and Organizational Capabilities
Technology change can significantly impact an organization’s capabilities. This can have
strategic consequences in terms of an organization’s ability to adapt to change. An organization’s
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core capabilities is what strategically differentiates itself from competition (Leonard-Barton,
1992). It is considered a set of differentiated skills, asset, and routines that become a basis for a
firm’s competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1990). When technology changes, these
advantages may no longer be sustainable. Core capabilities are developed to exploit the status
quo (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000) through consolidation and higher barriers of entry
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Exploiting industry-specific capabilities also increases the
likelihood that incumbents are able to exploit technology within that industry (Mitchell, 1989).
But core capabilities become institutionalized, which leads to inertia, which leads to a
paradox of core capabilities simultaneously enhancing and inhibiting an organization’s
development (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In other words, change can enhance an organization’s
competitive advantage through its core capabilities or destroy it (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
Digital Equipment Corporation demonstrated it had the capabilities and ability to adapt to
the technology change created by the emergence of the personal computer. It quickly developed
a line of personal computers that were considered technologically superior to other personal
computers on the market. Yet, Digital Equipment Corporation still failed. This suggests that the
relationship between technological change, organizational capabilities, and organizational failure
may provide an incomplete picture. To better understand this, a broader analysis of the changing
institutional context and logics may be required.
Institutional Change and Institutional Logics
Institutional logics is embedded in the institutional theory literature, which argued that
the dominant neoclassical economics literature provided an incomplete explanation of individual
and organizational behavior (Friedland & Alford, 1991). While seen as a rational resource
allocation system by neoclassical economics, organizations are also institutions influenced not
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only be technical pressures but by social or institutional pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Framed early on as rational myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and rule
like social facts (Zucker, 1977), Scott (2008) formalized institutions as being “comprised as
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (p. 48). Institutions provide context and
meaning, which is then manifested into an archetype for organizing (Greenwood & Hinings,
1996). This includes cultural rules, cognitive structures, and material practices that form into
institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).
Thornton & Ocasio (2008) define institutional logics as socially constructed, historical
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning
to their social reality. It embodies both the symbolic (culture and cognitive structure) and the
material (practices and processes) that form into taken-for-granted rules (Thornton & Ocasio,
1983) and organizing principles (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Institutional logics bring structure and
order to organizations and organizational life. It can be viewed as a multi-level concept, focused
on the societal level (Friedland & Alford, 1991), organizational field level (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983), industry level (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), and organizational level (Prahalad & Bettis,
1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995).
These various levels form a relational effect. For example, organizations are embedded in
organizational fields and industries. While market forces within fields and industries move
organizations into particular structures so to gain technical efficiencies, social forces move
organizations to adapt their organizational logics in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and
power (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At the organizational level, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) and
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Bettis and Prahalad (1995) describe how the collective mental model of the organization’s top
management team form into organizational logics that influence how it conceptualizes its
business and filters information from broader environmental forces. Schein (1983) specifically
points to an organization’s founder’s ability to influence its culture and logics. The founder
brings to the organization his or her particular interests, beliefs, and ideas on how to better serve
the existing market or create a new market, which in many ways drive its culture and material
structure and practices.
While the literature on organizational institutionalism has focused on how downward
pressure through isomorphism leads to convergent change that promotes stability and order
through institutional logics, more recent literature has explored divergent change of the
institutional context itself. Hinings, et al. (2004) describe a process where external forces such as
social, regulatory, and technology can destabilize an existing institutional order and open it up to
new possibilities. When this occurs organizations must make sense of such change and respond
with their own innovations. In essence, these organizations, with their innovations, compete for
the attention of the broader industry or field. As particular innovations diffuse across a field or
industry, it becomes institutionalized into the “new normal.” Organizations will converge to this
new order, while those that resist risks irrelevancy or event failure.
This suggests that dominant institutional logics are not solidified and can shift towards
new dominant institutional logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009). How an organization interprets and
responds to such shifts becomes critical to its survival. This paper explores this through Digital
Equipment Corporation’s reaction to the shift in dominant institutional logics during the
emergence of the personal computer.
Research Design and Methods
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When beginning this research, several books were reviewed (see Rifkin & Harrar, 1988;
Schein et al., 2003; Earls, 2004 for examples) in order to gain a broad sense of computer
industry’s history and the history of Digital Equipment Corporation. It is important to note that
the computer industry, in this study, is defined as manufacturers of the mainframe,
minicomputer, and personal computers. While each of these computer types represents a distinct
era of computing, manufacturers often competed in all of these product markets. Digital
Equipment Corporation was primarily a minicomputer manufacturer but moved into the personal
computer market and even the mainframe market.
Data were collected primarily through secondary sources that included articles from trade
publications and newspaper accounts between 1970 and 1998. This was done as a way to capture
the voices of industry analysts, major customers, and managers and leaders at Digital Equipment
Corporation as technological change occurred. A total of 219 articles were used, primarily from
The New York Times, a daily newspaper covering all news including business and technology
and Computer World, a trade publication devoted to computer and information technologies.
Selecting particular articles began by simply using the company’s name as a search criterion.
Articles were quickly reviewed and those that were personal in nature, such as announcements of
promotions, or product and technology reviews were dismissed. Articles that indirectly
referenced Digital Equipment Corporation were also dismissed unless it related to a broader
topic of the industry and Digital Equipment Corporation’s history. In addition, eight in-depth
interviews were conducted as a way to validate and supplement data collected from secondary
sources.
The analysis was broken into two major phases. The first phase involved constructing a
history of Digital Equipment Corporation that identified, organized, and recorded significant
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points of time in its history. The intent of this history was to identify and explain periods of
change happening at Digital Equipment Corporation as well as the broader computer industry.
The second part of the analysis organized data into themes. This was done following Gioia’s
method of first-order and second-order analysis (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). During firstorder analysis, themes and categories were identified, adhering faithfully to the voice of
secondary data as well as the interviewees. A repetition technique (Ryan and Bernard, 2003) was
used, looking at sentences and segments of sentences that seem to point to topics that occurred
and reoccurred. Second-order analysis was then used to identify patterns from themes and
categories. These patterns served as the basis to go back into the literature in order to analyze
why Digital Equipment Corporation failed. Before providing an analysis of its failure, a history
of the rise and fall of Digital Equipment Corporation is presented, starting with a brief
introduction of the company.
Logics at the Organizational Level: Introducing Digital Equipment Corporation
Digital Equipment Corporation was founded in 1957 by Ken Olsen and Harlan Anderson.
Inspired by their work as engineers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln
Laboratory, they created Digital Equipment Corporation as a way to commercialize the
technologies being created at the Lincoln Laboratory and in particular their vision for a general
computer that was smaller, more interactive, and less expensive than existing mainframe
computers (Hughes, 1998). Harlan Anderson was the company’s chief accounting and financial
officer, while Ken Olsen was president and chief executive officer (Rifkin, 1986).
Schein (1983) describes the importance of the founder in an organization’s culture. Ken
Olsen would become a larger-than-life presence throughout Digital Equipment Corporation. Not
only did he have a significant stature within Digital Equipment Corporation but also throughout
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the industry. In October 1986, Olsen appeared on the cover of Fortune magazine titled,
“America’s most successful entrepreneur” (Petre, 1986). The values, beliefs, and philosophies,
and ultimately the organizational logics, of Digital Equipment Corporation were, in many
significant ways, those of Ken Olsen. In Schein’s inside story of the rise and fall of Digital
(Schein et al. 2003), three chapters are devoted exclusively to Ken Olsen. Schein described
Olsen as someone who believed in building an organization as a family where everyone was
accepted, and debate and conflict resolution were the primary mechanisms for deciding what to
do (Schein, 1998).
Ken Olsen was an engineer first and a business person second. While at MIT Lincoln
Laboratories, Olsen enjoyed its entrepreneurial, yet collegial, environment where engineers were
free to pursue their ideas and often collaborated together on various projects. Decisions on
projects were made through open dialogue and many times through honest argument and
political support. Through conflict, Olsen believed, the best answer would emerge. Ken Olsen
would take this experience and build a company where engineers, not administrators, would lead.
This experience would influence the organizational logics of Digital Equipment
Corporation. With its roots in the scientific and engineering research world, Digital Equipment
Corporation became known as an engineer’s paradise and as a result attracted the industry’s best
engineers. It resembled, in many ways, Olsen’s life at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. Given its
engineering-centric nature, Digital Equipment Corporation was committed to building, the
highest quality and most technologically superior computers. Ken Olsen strongly believed that
the organization with the highest quality and technologically superior computers will dominate
the market. Digital Equipment Corporation’s engineering design was seen as its competitive
advantage. Because of this, proprietary technology became a cornerstone to its strategy.
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Developing computers as a proprietary closed system was a way to protect one’s technology and
competitive advantage. Marketing become almost nonexistent. Ken Olsen believed that
customers would seek out the highest quality and highest performing technology, and when they
did, they would find Digital Equipment Corporation.
These beliefs manifested into organizational logics. Similar to Thornton & Ocasio
(2008), Friedland & Alford (1991) defines institutional logics as a set of material practices and
symbolic constructions that become organizing principles. By integrating these definitions with
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) conceptual representation of organizational logics as the collective
mental model of an organization’s leaders, Table 1 presents Digital Equipment Corporation’s
dominant organizational logics.

-------------------TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE----------------------

The evolution of the computer industry
Digital Equipment Corporation’s minicomputer represented discontinuous technology
change. It created new applications, new accessibility, and a new market. With this change,
Digital Equipment Corporation became a market leader and was considered a technological
innovator and pioneer. This success reinforced Digital Equipment Corporation’s dominant
organizational logics. As a way to understand this within the broader institutional context, a short
history of the evolution of the computer industry will be provided.
The early computer industry: The mainframe
Digital Equipment Corporation entered the computer industry in 1960 when the central
product at that time was the large mainframe computer. These computers were designed to
process large amounts of data and transactions through batched jobs typically run overnight.
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These jobs were processed through centralized applications such as payroll, inventory,
accounting and financial reporting, and customer data. Little interaction, if any, were required by
computer users. Computer operators and specialists were hired to run these batched jobs as well
as manage the maintenance of the mainframe computer and its associated computing
environment. The size of the mainframe was such that it required its own temperature-controlled
room typically far away from users. The computer architecture and design of mainframes was
proprietary, not accessible to other companies or customers. What this meant was that consumers
had to commit to a manufacturer’s entire computing environment, both hardware and software.
This required a large commitment, both financially and technologically and once a decision was
made, the consumer was “locked in” to the manufacturer. This typically led to lucrative service
contracts for manufacturers.
Given its cost and proprietary nature, mainframe computers were sold and serviced
directly by the manufacturer. Their target market was large organizations such as insurance or
financial companies. Significant resources were invested in building an internal sales force that
acted as consultants as a way to sell equipment, software, and services. Over time these
practices, beliefs, and values became institutionalized across the organizational field and formed
into institutional logics. Influenced by higher-level societal institutional logics formed during the
post-World War II period that emphasized centralized planning and technological advancements,
the institutional logics of the mainframe era became dominant within the computer industry.
Using the same framework created through Thornton & Ocasio (2008) and Friedland & Alford
(1991) definition of institutional logics, Table 2 identifies the critical elements of this logics.

-------------------TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE----------------------
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The introduction of the minicomputer
Digital Equipment Corporation’s minicomputer, the PDP-1, was much smaller and less
powerful compared to the mainframe but was more interactive and significantly less expensive.
Instead of requiring its own temperature controlled room and a staff of computer specialists, the
minicomputer could be located anywhere in the factory, scientific laboratory, or office and
required only the expertise of an advanced user. Minicomputers initially found a market within
the scientific and engineering community, and it was not unusual for engineers and scientists to
learn how to program their minicomputer. This innovation led to great success for Digital
Equipment Corporation and the market for the minicomputer expanded to the business world and
signaled a radical change in computing (Earls, 2004). With growing adoption, both the
minicomputer market and Digital Equipment Corporation experienced considerable growth
through the 1970s. The company went from $188 million in annual sales with 7,800 employees
in 1972 to just over $1 billion in sales with 36,000 employees in 1977 (Earls, 2004). Its rise was
meteoric. Digital Equipment Corporation would grow to $14 billion in revenue by 1990 and over
120,000 employees, making it the largest minicomputer manufacturer and second largest overall
computer manufacturer in the country. The growth and success experienced by Digital
Equipment Corporation were seen not only as a validation of its strong technological and
engineering capabilities, it was a validation of its organizational logics’ consistency and
compatibility of the broader dominant institutional logics of the mainframe era.
The emergence of the personal computer
Digital Equipment Corporation continued to improve its minicomputer product line and
in the mid-1970s introduced its new state-of-the-art technology—the VAX minicomputer.
Roughly the same time, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak introduced their first personal computer,
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called the Apple II. Targeted to the computer hobbyist and home user, the personal computer,
like the minicomputer before it, was considered a discontinuous technological change. But
culturally and cognitively, the personal computer represented something very different. The
mainframe and minicomputer originated from the military-industrial-academic complex with a
culture of centralized planning and control. Computing was thought of as large transactional and
data processing applications as well as sophisticated scientific and engineering applications. The
technological design was important and needed to be protected. Mainframe and minicomputers
were also high-margin products and with the proprietary nature of the technology, they were sold
and serviced by the manufacturer. The personal computer, on the other hand, originated from the
hobbyist and hacker culture and represented decentralized individual-centric computing. Its
initial target market was individual hobbyists, home users, and small professional businesses.
While the performance of the personal computer was significantly less than mainframe and
minicomputers, it was good enough for its target market and, most importantly, its price made
the product accessible.
While the price of a personal computer was significantly less than mainframe and
minicomputers, so were its margins. The practice of mass production and mass marketing was
adopted as a way to build market share in order to compensate for low margins. A new
distribution system emerged, involving retailers, to support its mass distribution. What was
perhaps the most significant about this technological change was not necessarily the technology.
Most incumbent mainframe and minicomputers had the means of developing personal computers
and did. What became significant was the shift of the institutional context and dominant
institutional logics. The industry shifted from logics of the mainframe/minicomputer era to logics
of the personal computer era. Table 3 summarizes this distinction.
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-------------------TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE----------------------

The IBM PC
Institutional change is precipitated by significant events that jolt and destabilize an
organizational field (Hinings et al., 2004). But events do not carry any independent or objective
meaning. They require actors to pay attention, interpret, and make meaning (Meyer, 1982). In
other words, jolts are socially constructed (Munir, 2005). Incumbents interpret and then respond
in ways that can shape and influence the jolts and subsequent institutional change. In the
technological change of the personal computer, one particular incumbent, International Business
Machines (IBM), interpreted and responded is such a way that dramatically influenced this shift
of the field’s dominant institutional logics.
Up to this point in time in the industry’s history, IBM was the largest computer
manufacturer in the world. Originally a mainframe manufacturer, IBM initially ignored the
emergence of the minicomputer but was able to recover and become a strong competitor in the
minicomputer market. Recognizing that computing was evolving towards smaller machines and
perhaps motivated by an earlier mistake when they first ignored the minicomputer (Metz, 1981;
Pollack, 1981), IBM moved quickly to enter the personal computer market and in 1981
introduced its new personal computer called the IBM PC. Priced at around $1,500, the IBM PC
was designed for businesses, schools, and homes. In addition, IBM offered a library of optional
software as well as the BASIC programming language so software developers and organizations
could create their own computer software application.
With its size, legitimacy, success, and power, IBM had the resources to legitimize the
personal computer with organizations. The challenge for IBM was its bureaucracy, which would
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make it difficult for them to build a personal computer quickly enough to compete with the
growing personal computer manufacturers. One analyst was quoted as saying, “IBM bringing out
a personal computer would be like teaching an elephant to tap dance” (“The birth of the IBM
PC,” n.d., para. 3). To counteract its own bureaucracy, a task force group was established
outside of IBM’s hierarchy and was challenged to build a personal computer within 12 months.
IBM had never built anything in 12 months, so in order to meet this challenge, the task group
decided to open its computer design and architecture to other companies as a way to speed the
development of components and software1. Most significantly, IBM outsourced the two most
critical components of the personal computer, the operating system, and microprocessor. The
operating system was outsourced to a then relatively unknown company called Microsoft and the
microprocessor was outsourced to Intel. This move would reshape the central source for
achieving a competitive advantage as IBM relied, not on its engineering capabilities, but on its
mass marketing capabilities.
Digital Equipment Corporation’s response
Digital Equipment Corporation first reacted to the IBM PC as underwhelmed by its
design and technology. It believed it could build a technologically superior personal computer
and committed significant resources to do just that. Given Digital Equipment Corporation’s
success under its existing dominant organizational logics, focusing on the performance of
proprietary technology seemed to make sense. The personal computer became Digital Equipment
Corporation’s central product strategy and in 1982 introduced not one, but three lines of personal
computers, the Rainbow 100, DECmate II, and the Professional Series (“Digital to Offer New
Products,” 1982). At this point, IBM’s decision to open its architecture and outsource software
and components led to the emergence of industry standards that allowed any manufacturer to

17

build IBM PC compatible personal computers or IBM PC clones. By doing this, personal
computer manufacturers were assured of becoming part of the ecosystem, providing access to a
mass market committed to its open computing architecture. The institutional context and its
dominant institutional logics were beginning to shift. Digital Equipment Corporation responded
by utilizing its existing proprietary PDP minicomputer technology to build its personal computer
(“Digital to Offer New Products,” 1982). With this response, Digital Equipment Corporation
rejected this shift and continued following its existing organizational logics rooted in the
institutional context of the mainframe/minicomputer era. While this resulted in what was widely
considered technologically superior personal computers, it left consumers and analysts confused.
Why was Digital Equipment Corporation building personal computers incompatible with
industry standards? Digital Equipment Corporation found itself on the outside of a shifting
institutional context and its new personal computer lines never gained any market traction.
Unable to make any inroads in the personal computer market, Digital Equipment
Corporation began to experience a significant decline in earnings (Laberis, 1982; “DEC profits
Fall 36%, First Drop in Seven Years,” 1982; Pollack, 1983a; Pollack, 1983b). This did not deter
Olsen who saw it as a temporary setback and predicted that Digital Equipment Corporation’s real
problem would be meeting a highly anticipated demand of their new personal computers
(Laberis, 1982). This never occurred. As a response, the company decided to move back to its
VAX minicomputer technology as part of a strategy to move into a growing office automation
market (“DEC Shows Its Colors in Traveling Road Show,” 1982). This move was meant to
boost demand for its VAX minicomputer and find a market for its personal computers. Digital
Equipment Corporation entered a crowded office automation market with more than 300
competing companies (Dooley, 1982). IBM also entered this market and quickly became a
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market leader with its PCs. The shift in the industry’s institutional context continued to grow, but
Digital Equipment Corporation continued to resist.
Digital Equipment Corporation continued to experience financial problems. In January
1992, the company reported a quarterly loss of $138 million (“Digital has Large Loss in
Quarter,” 1992), the next quarter it reported a quarterly loss of $234 million, and the next quarter
a $294 million loss (“Digital Posts Huge Deficit,” 1992). Finally, in the last quarter of the 1992
fiscal year, Digital Equipment Corporation reported a staggering $1.85 billion quarterly loss
(Rifkin, 1992a). For the entire fiscal year, the company lost $2.8 billion. In addition to its lack of
success in the personal computer market, Digital Equipment Corporation was experiencing a
sharp decline in sales of its minicomputers. A fundamental shift was occurring from the
institutional logics of the mainframe/minicomputer era to the logics of the personal computer era.
Analysts and consumers became increasingly confused as to what business Digital Equipment
Corporation was going to be in over the next five to ten years (Rifkin, 1991). The demand for its
core product line, the minicomputer, had fallen dramatically over the years and there was a sense
of disarray at the company’s highest levels (Rifkin 1991).
A reluctant adoption
Digital Equipment Corporation eventually decided to make a shift and develop personal
computers compatible with the IBM PC design. But this decision appeared to come too late. Ken
Olsen stepped down as CEO and was replaced by vice president of manufacturing, Robert
Palmer, who moved quickly to cut costs through massive layoffs, diversification of assets, and
organizational restructuring. Palmer also returned the company to its original organizational
logics centered proprietary technology. He focused on the introduction of a new microprocessor
technology called Alpha. The Alpha was an ultra-fast microprocessor, exponentially faster than
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all competitors’ including market-leader, Intel. Digital Equipment Corporation, once again,
demonstrated that it could develop new technology better than most (“Digital Introduces an
Advanced Chip,” 1992; Rifkin, 1992b), but this time it tried to borrow a page from IBM by
attempting to create new industry standard through of licensing of the Alpha technology. While
early partnerships were created, these partnerships did not last very long. Digital Equipment
Corporation never achieved strong adoption for its Alpha technology and in April 1997, Digital
Equipment Corporation reported a 50% drop in quarterly profits. Demand for Alpha technology
was shrinking (Zuckerman, 1997).
The failure of the Alpha technology proved to be Digital Equipment Corporation’s final
act. On January 26, 1998, Compaq Computer Corporation agreed to buy Digital Equipment
Corporation for $9.6 billion in cash and stock. It was the largest takeover in the computer
industry at that time (Hansell, 1998). This acquisition represented the shift in the institutional
context that occurred in the computer industry, a shift Digital Equipment Corporation resisted
despite its ability to adapt to the technological change. Compaq Computer Corporation was at the
time the largest personal computer maker in the world and had just acquired the largest
minicomputer company.
Analysis of Digital Equipment Corporation’s Failure
This article now turns to an analysis, using institutional change and institutional logics, to
explain its failure. Given that institutional logics can be viewed as a multi-layered,
interdependency between levels will emerge (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Organizations are both
influenced and influence field-level logics, which then shapes changes of an industry’s dominant
institutional logics. In the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, development of the
minicomputer was done within the existing dominant mainframe era institutional logics. While
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the minicomputer may have been a discontinuous and disruptive technology change, it had
minimal impact on the field’s existing dominant institutional logics. The fundamental problem
for incumbents became adapting to new technology. Even if incumbents initially ignored the
technology change, it is reasonable to expect that by using their legitimacy, power, and resources
accumulated within the existing institutional context that these incumbents would be able to
catch up and even surpass the first-movers of technology change. This explains why mainframe
market leaders, like IBM, were able to make up significant market ground and become strong
competitors after being caught off-guard by the discontinuous change. A 1983 survey of the top
20 minicomputer manufacturers included six mainframe manufacturers, including IBM as the
third largest minicomputer manufacturer (Henkel, 1983).
The personal computer, on the other hand, represented a divergent change of the
institutional context and a shift of the dominant institutional logics. Digital Equipment
Corporation, while adapting to the technological change of the personal computer, did so within
the institutional context formed during the mainframe and minicomputer eras. Its organizational
logics became incompatible with the changing field-level logics. This suggests that the degree of
risk for incumbents facing technology change is influenced not so much by the technology
change, but by the degree of change to the dominant institutional logics.
Hinings et al. (2004) point out that divergent change in the form of environmental jolts
will lead an organizational field into a period of destabilization, creating opportunities for new
dominant institutional logics to emerge. This places significant pressure on incumbents to
respond to not only technology change but logics change. But as Munir (2005) points out,
environmental jolts are socially constructed and require interpretations by incumbents to form
meaning. How an incumbent responds to such jolts is largely influenced by its own
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organizational logics. This becomes a significant challenge for incumbents. They must find a
way to interpret and respond free from its own institutionalized organizational logics. A
comparison of responses by IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation bear this out.
Why IBM and not Digital Equipment Corporation
Comparing IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation during this period provides insight
into how incumbents might avoid failure like Digital Equipment Corporation. Both IBM and
Digital Equipment Corporation were formed during a period where the institutional context was
dominated by the institutional logics of the mainframe and minicomputer era. So, why was IBM
able to dominate, for a period, the new personal computer market while Digital Equipment
Corporation failed? Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) argues that organizations evolve through
periods of incremental change dominated by mature technologies that is then punctuated by
periods of revolutionary or discontinuous change dominated by new technologies. They further
argue that organizations need to be ambidextrous in exploiting mature technologies through
efficient incremental change while also exploring new technologies through flexible
experimentation. This is difficult for any organization but particularly difficult when
discontinuous change represents both a shift in technology and the industry’s dominant
institutional logics. Existing mainframe manufacturers were able to meet the challenge of
minicomputer because the challenge was limited to technology. The personal computer, on the
other hand, represented a shift in technology and dominant institutional logics. Digital
Equipment Corporation was able to meet the challenge of the technology change but did not
respond to the shift in dominant institutional logics. IBM responded respond to both. To
understand why requires, as Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) argued, a look inside each firm at the
key decisions that were made.
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IBM interpreted and responded to the emergence of the personal computer by creating a
task force outside its existing organizational structure and logics. This was largely done as a way
to shrink development time. Unencumbered by institutionalized pressures both at the industry
and organizational level, the task group was also able to break from IBM’s existing dominant
logics to innovate and change both the technology and institutional logics. The task group was
able to engage with outside vendors to develop components and applications. The shift in the
dominant institutional logics from a closed to open computer design led to the creation of a new
ecosystem and then into industry standards. IBM addressed not only the technology but also the
institutional context.
Digital Equipment Corporation’s interpretation and response focused exclusively on the
technology and not the broader institutional context. When faced with the challenge of IBM’s
new personal computer, Digital Equipment Corporation saw its solution as building a
technologically superior computer. The company was organized as a product-management
matrix structure with its operating committee acting as internal venture capitalists, listening to
project proposals and deciding on funding. This structure appeared to contain the same level of
autonomy as IBM’s personal computer task group. Digital Equipment Corporation’s product
managers were free to pursue projects with little constraints other than securing internal
resources and funding.
Digital Equipment Corporation’s product-management matrix structure provided so much
autonomy that more than one product development team emerged to compete with each other in
developing a personal computer. This represented a significant investment by Digital Equipment
Corporation and, as Ken Olsen commented, a competitive internal market process that would
maximize innovation. But two problem emerged. The first was the strategic confusion caused by
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multiple product development teams independently pursuing the personal computer. Not only
was this confusing for employees, it was confusing for consumers. The result was three different
personal computer product lines, each incompatible with each other. The second problem was
that even with such autonomy, it was still within the existing organizational structure. This meant
that product managers and product teams still operated within the context of the Digital
Equipment Corporation’s existing dominant logics, which was aligned to the institutional logics
of the mainframe and minicomputer era but not to the personal computer era.
Implications for Practice
This comparison between IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation raises several
implications for practice. Organizations when faced with technology change must be sensitive to
the possible impact that change has on the broader organizational field and institutional context.
To shift this perspective, organizations need to engage in problem-solving rather than just
decision-making. Problem-solving involves choosing appropriate issues and framing a situation
in a way that may challenge existing assumptions and cognitive biases in order to identify novel
possibilities, while decision-making is choosing the best possibility (Bhardwaj, Crocker, Sims,
& Wang, 2018). Digital Equipment was able to make decisions but unable to properly frame and
reframe the problem.
Another implication for practice relates to organizational structure. Organizations may be
better served addressing institutional change outside of its existing organizational structure.
Tushman and O’Reilly (2002) point to autonomous business units as part of an organization’s
structural design to foster exploration and innovation. This may not be enough. Digital
Equipment Corporation had a structure that allowed for autonomy but still could not overcome
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the organization’s existing logics. IBM, on the other hand, created a task force completely
outside its organizational structure.
While an internal market structure, where managers are free to pursue ideas and compete
with each other for corporate resources, may seem like an efficient and agile way to innovate, it
can lead to confusion both internally and externally. IBM created the strategic mandate for a
single task group to operate outside of its structure. Digital Equipment Corporate created a
structure that allowed its product managers to operate as entrepreneurs, which led to confusion
and incompatible product lines.
Finally, organizations must understand the innovation occurs not only at the
organizational level but also at the institutional level. Institutional innovation may provide a
significant opportunity for organizations to reshape itself and its industry.
Conclusion and Future Research
This case demonstrates that organizational failure during periods of technological
changes may not be the direct result of technology. Organizations can adapt to technology
change and still fail. This can occur when technology change causes a shift in the dominant
institutional logics of the organizational field. Digital Equipment Corporation adapted to the
technology change brought on by the emerging personal computer but resisted the broader
changes in the institutional context. This suggests that focusing on technology change may not
be enough. But this study focused on a single organization, which makes it difficult to draw
generalizations. More case studies are needed using institutional analysis to better understand
organizational failure. Also, while this study suggests what organizations might do to avoid
failures like Digital Equipment Corporation, more research is needed in drawing further and
more detailed implications for practice.
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NOTES
1. In 2007, Apple Computer, Inc. removed “Computer” from its name. This change was
representative of its shift from a computer company to a consumer electronics company.

2. This move actually led to a new market of IBM compatible personal computers (or IBM
clones), which by the 1990s eroded any advantage IBM have in this personal computer
market. Compaq Computer, Inc., the market leader of the personal computer by the mid1990s was created to build and market IBM clone personal computers.
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Table 1
Dominant Organizatonal Logics of Digital Equipment Corporation

Components of
Institutional Logics

Organizing Principles

Symbolic Construction:
Culture & Cognitive
Structures

Culture
• Rooted in co-founder Ken Olsen’s early experience in a large
Industrial-Military-Academic research organization
• Paternal organization: differences, conflict, and open-debate is
encouraged
• Individual freedom to do the right thing
Cognitive Structure
• Competitive advantage comes from technical and engineering
excellence
• Well engineered products will sell themselves
• Computing was for scientific and business organizations, not
individuals

Material Practices

•
•
•
•
•
•

Engineering-centric organization where engineers’ ideas were
privileged and prioritized
Closed and proprietary computer design
High-quality operation driven by strong research &
development
Centralized minicomputers designed for science and business
applications
Very limited marketing
Internal market using product-management matrix structure
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Table 2.
Logics of the mainframe and minicomputer era

Components of
Institutional Logics

Organizing Principles

Symbolic Construction:
Culture & Cognitive
Structures

Culture
• Rooted in the centralized Military-Industrial-Academic
complex culture
Cognitive Structure
• Growth comes through direct sales and service to large
organizations.
• Increased profit comes through high-priced, high-margin
product lines
• Competitive advantage comes through technical and
engineering designs

Material Practices

•
•
•
•

Central products were mainframe and minicomputers
designed for centralized computing for large companies
Compete on closed and proprietary computer design
Centralized manufacturer sales force focused on consultative
sales
Sales and distribution direct from manufacturer
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Table 3
A Shift in Dominant Institutional Logics in the Computer Industry
Organizing principles of the
mainframe/minicomputer era
Symbolic Construction:
Culture & Cognitive
Structures

Material Practices

Organizing principles of the
personal computer era

Culture
• Rooted in the centralized
Military-Industrial-Academic
complex culture

Culture
• Rooted in the Hobbyist
and Hacker culture

Cognitive Structure
• Growth comes through direct
sales and service to large
organizations.
• Increased profit comes through
high-priced, high-margin
product lines
• Competitive advantage comes
through technical and
engineering designs
• Closed system architecture

Culture Structure
• Growth through
economies-of-scale and
mass-marketing.
• Increased sales through
low-priced, low-margin
product lines.
• Competitive advantage
comes through
compatibility and
marketing
• Open system architecture

•

•

•
•

•

Central products were
mainframe and minicomputers
designed for centralized
computing for large companies
Compete on closed and
proprietary computer design
Centralized manufacturer sales
force focused on consultative
sales
Sales and distribution direct
from manufacturer

•

•
•

Central product was the
personal computer
designed for individual
users
Created open and
nonproprietary computers
that adhere to Wintel
industry standards
Mass-marketing
Distribution through
manufacturer and retailers

